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Abstract:  This paper studies the factors associated with the size of the public sector as 
measured by government spending at the level of Chinese provinces using the method of 
extreme bounds analysis to identify robust correlates with public sector size. We find that 
almost all traditional “economic” and “social stability” factors are insignificant and not robust 
to model specification changes. In contrast, “political” factors such as the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and national transfers to provincial governments tend to be significant and 
robust. Our findings suggest that repeated government attempts to reduce the relative size of 
the Chinese government sector have failed because the political factors determining 
government spending haven’t changed. 
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In the 1980s the Chinese government initiated a campaign to shrink the Chinese public sector 
as well as make it more efficient. The objective was to move from a heavily planned economy 
to a more market-based one. Each five-year plan from 1982 to the most recent in 2013 have 
attempted to implement this policy (Cooke, 2003; Burns, 2003; Wang, 2010; Børdgard, 2014).  
 
As Figure 1 shows, the initial attempts at reducing the size of the Chinese government seemed 
promising as public spending as a share of GDP fell from 1978-1996.1 But this was not lasting 
and government spending has since increased. The obvious question is why?  
 
Answering this question is important because: (1) the Chinese economy measured using PPP 
exchange rates is currently the largest in the world and has considerable influence on world 
economic activity; (2) it is possible that the factors affecting the size of the Chinese government 
may be different from those affecting Western market-based economies and knowing this helps 
us better understand how transitional economies differ from market economies; and (3) it will 
help the Chinese government design more effective policies to meet its objective of smaller 
government. 
 
                                                 
1 Publicly funded  service units or shiye danwei consist of areas such as culture, education, public health, 














Figure 1: Government spending as a share of nominal GDP
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2. Literature  
 
The factors explaining government size in China can be split into “economic”, “social 
stability”, and “political” factors. The most common economic factor is the level of 
development of an economy.2  Wagner’s Law (Wagner, 1994; Gandhi, 1971) proposes that as 
people become richer they demand more public goods and seek more income insurance through 
government programs, or that government spending has an income elasticity greater than one. 
A country with more young and old people will naturally result in government spending more 
on services such as education and health (Wu and Lin, 2012). If there are high fixed costs in 
producing government services, then countries with higher population densities may have 
lower marginal costs and lower proportionate levels of spending through scale economies in 
the provision of public goods. Being more open can lead to more volatile domestic incomes 
and induce governments to spend more to insure its citizens against fluctuations, or spend less 
to increase the competiveness of their exporters (Liberati, 2007). 
  
One factor associated with social stability is the degree of ethnic diversity, as greater diversity 
could generate greater social conflict (Annett, 2001). This could lead to greater government 
spending to appease each ethnic group to ensure social peace. The degree of urbanization might 
also be tied to potential unrest. A more concentrated population might create greater resource 
disputes, or be better able to organize demonstrations and protests. Although an alternative but 
observationally equivalent hypothesis is that greater urbanization could cause an increased 
demand for government services that have public good features.  
 
Political factors relate to a country’s political system and its budgetary processes. Things such 
as the number of political parties or type of electoral system have little relevance to China. But 
other factors are likely relevant. One is the degree to which spending is decentralized, or the 
Leviathan hypothesis (Grossman, 1989; Zhu and Krug, 2005). The hypothesis is that greater 
centralization of government spending induces larger total government spending because of 
the monopolization of budgetary power by the national government. Another factor is the share 
of central government fiscal transfers to lower levels of government, also known as the 
Flypaper Effect (Hines and Thaler, 1995). By this argument, increased transfers promote 
collusion between different levels of government resulting in higher total government 
                                                 
2 Kau and Rubin (1981) and Shelton (2007) discuss likely determinants of government size. 
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spending.3 A different type of factor is existing government indebtedness, with greater 
government debt leading to greater spending obligations. 
 
A number of studies have investigated the determinants of the size of the Chinese public sector. 
Wu and Lin (2012) study provincial government expenditures using a panel data set for the 
period 1998-2006. They find evidence that increased openness limits the size of provincial 
governments, and that there are economies of scale in the provision of provincial level public 
services. Their evidence does not support Wagner’s law however, and the degree of 
urbanization, the dependency ratio, the urban unemployment rate, and minority population rate 
have no statistically significant impact on government size. Wu and Lin do find evidence that 
fiscal decentralization increases provincial government spending, other things equal. 
 
Tobin (2005) looks specifically at Wagner’s law and finds support for it between 1978-2001. 
Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) find evidence supporting Wagner’s law for some but not 
all provinces. Chen (2004) focuses on the relationship between provincial and central 
government and finds that increased fiscal decentralization leads to higher provincial 
government spending. He also finds that greater collusion between local and central 
government (as measured by extra-budgetary items) also increases government spending. 
Finally, Chen’s results support Wagner’s law. Lee and Vuletin (2012) focus on the flypaper 
effect in China and find support for it from 1980-2008. They also find that before China became 
a de facto federation around 1980, that the opposite of the flypaper effect occurred with central 
transfers tending to be rebated by provinces. In summary, previous studies have identified a 
number of determinants of government size in China.  However, there is disagreement among 
the studies, raising concerns about robustness. 
 
3. Data and method  
 
The data consist of observations on 31 Chinese provinces, Municipalities, and Autonomous 
                                                 
3 Our transfer variable is for 1995 onwards. Lee and Vuletin (2012) use a transfer variable from 1980 onwards. 
Their underlying assumption is that central government transfers equal provincial deficits from 1978-1993 based 
on the Budget Law in China which required balanced government budgets for all levels of sub-national 
governments. In practice this never happened. Even the current Budget Law still prohibits sub-national 
governments from borrowing without the approval of the central government. However, in practice many sub-
national governments borrow explicitly or implicitly (Qiao and Shah, 2006). The borrowing data is officially 
unavailable but estimates of government debt exist, although they are unreliable. 
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Regions from 1978-2008.4 The main sources are various years of the China Statistics 
Yearbook, the National Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, the Ministry of Finance Yearbook, the 
Local Fiscal Statistical Materials, and the Procuratorial Yearbook of China. The variables are 
defined in Table 1 (all are at the provincial level unless otherwise stated). 
 
Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Government size public sector spending as a % of nominal GDP (budget and extra-budget expenditures) 
Wagner’s Law log per capita real GDP 
Dependence Ratio ratio of non-working to working population 
Scale Economies log provincial population divided by the land area of a province in km2 
Trade Openness exports plus imports as a share of GDP 
Ethnic Diversity number of non-Han people to total population. 
Urbanization urban population as a share of total population 
Fiscal Decentralization 1 ratio of per capita provincial expenditures to national per capita central expenditures 
Fiscal Decentralization 2 ratio of per capita provincial expenditures to the sum of per capita central and provincial expenditures 
Flypaper Effect central government fiscal transfers as a share of total provincial revenue 
Deficit Ratio provincial government fiscal deficit as a % of GDP  
 
The Chinese political and economic systems are noticeably different from those in Western 
countries which are used in most studies explaining the size of government. This makes model 
selection difficult because of a lack of a clear guidance from theory and empirical studies about 
which variables should be included in an empirical model. To avoid the arbitrary selection of 
our empirical model and to ensure our results are robust to model specification we use the 
approach of extreme bounds analysis (EBA) developed by Leamer (1985), Levine and Renelt 
(1992), and Sala-i-Martin (1997).5 EBA systematically selects among competing alternative 
model specifications. The general form of the model is, 
it I it M it Z it itY I M Zα β β β µ= + + + +  
where Yit is the dependent variable, Iit includes explanatory variables that are the focus of a 
study, the Mit are explanatory variables that prior studies have shown to be significant, and the 
Zit are variables for which there is no clear guidance from the existing literature. In our study, 
Yit is the size of government measured by provincial government spending. The Iit and Mit 
variables are included in every estimated model specification and a search over combinations 
                                                 
4 This excludes Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 
5 We use the ExtremeBounds function in R written by Marek Hlavac (Hlavac, 2013). 
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of the Zit variables is then used to find the model of best fit. We assume that real GDP per 
capita, the dependence ratio, and population density are sufficiently common in studies and 
also likely to be relevant factors in China that we treat them as Mit variables. All remaining 
explanatory variables will be considered as Zit variables (and by implication Iit variables since 
they all of potential interest). 
 
The first estimation method uses the between estimator (31 observations). Hauk and Wacziarg 
(2009) find that the between estimator outperforms other panel data estimators when estimating 
growth models. The second uses fixed effects estimation of three panels involving five year 




Tables 2 and 3 contain the results. Results for the Sal-i-Martin criterion are presented, although 
robustness using the Leamer criterion is also indicated. A variable meets the Sal-i-Martin 
criteria if 95 percent of the density function of the estimates of its coefficient lie to the right or 
left of zero. The Leamer criterion is much stricter. Take the lowest and highest estimates of a 
coefficient across all possible model specifications. The criteria requires that the range from 
the smallest value of a confidence interval around the lowest estimate to the largest value of a 
confidence interval around the highest estimate not straddle zero.  
 
Consider the between estimator results. The signs of real GDP per capita (Wagner’s Law), the 
dependence ratio, population density (scale economies), fiscal transfers (flypaper effect) and 
the deficit ratio are consistent with theoretical predictions. The signs of ethnic diversity and 
fiscal decentralisation are not as predicted. The predicted signs of openness and urbanisation 
are undetermined and since no estimates are significant their estimated signs seem of little 
interest. The only robust variables using the Sal-i-Martin criteria are the political factors of 
fiscal decentralisation, the deficit ratio (for measure 1 of fiscal decentralisation) and fiscal 
transfers (for measure 2 of fiscal decentralisation). They are also significant in each case.  
 
The panel estimates have some noticeable differences from the between estimates. Central 
transfers are no longer significant nor meet the Salai-Martin criteria. The estimates of real GDP 
per capita and trade openness switch sign. But the deficit ratio and both measures of fiscal 
decentralisation remain robust and significant. Using regional fixed effects with provinces 
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categorised into Eastern, Central, or Western produced no noticeable changes and the regional 
variables were insignificant and fragile. 
 
One general conclusion is that political factors dominate other factors. As provincial 
governments run fiscal deficits they have to meet interest and principal repayment obligations. 
The estimates for this factor are consistent with this prediction. The degree of fiscal 
decentralisation is also significant and robust. The puzzle is that our estimates imply provincial 
governments with a greater fiscal role spend more, which is the opposite of the Leviathan 
hypothesis. One possibility is that the central government experiences less pressure to respond 
to local political conditions and is thus more frugal than provincial governments which are 
more deeply ingrained in local affairs. This is more likely the less mobile is a provincial 
population as there will then be less inter-jurisdictional competition, which has typically been 
the case in China. 
 
In contrast, factors normally found to be significant in studying Western style market 
economies are insignificant. For example, the estimates imply that demand for public goods is 
ignored as people become wealthier. Or, Wagner’s law does not hold. Similarly for the rise in 
urbanisation or the increase in dependents. The insignificant and fragile estimate for ethnicity 
could be interpreted as provincial governments using political and legal control rather than 




This study finds that the robust determinants of the size of Chinese provincial governments are 
the degree of fiscal decentralisation, transfers from the national to provincial governments, and 
the deficits of provincial governments. Interestingly, none of the variables identified as 
significant in previous studies are found to be robust or significant. Roughly speaking, political 
factors seem to dominate economic or social stability factors in determining provincial 
government spending. It seems clear now why repeated government attempts to reduce the 
relative size of the Chinese government sector have failed. Our findings suggest that this is 
because ultimately the political factors determining government spending haven’t changed. 
Until these underlying political priorities change, whatever they are, then attempts to reduce 
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Table 2: Government Spending and Average of 1978-2008 Variables 
Variables 
Coefficients with Fiscal Decentralisation 1  Coefficients with Fiscal Decentralisation 2 



























































































































84.38 100.00 99.28* 



























50.00 100.00 94.89 
Notes: Provincial public sector spending as a % of GDP is the dependent variable and includes a constant. Fraction significant includes all cases of significant estimates 
regardless of their sign. CDF non-normal is the proportion of the CDF of the estimated coefficient not assuming normality. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Robust variables using the Sala-i-Martin (1997) 95% criteria have their CDF > 0.95 and are indicated by *. Robust variables using the Leamer (1985) criteria are those which 
the lower and upper extreme bounds have the same sign calculated using the 95 percent confidence intervals for the Max and Min estimates and are indicated by †.  
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Table 3: Government Spending and 5 Year Panels Between 1994-2008 
Variables 
Coefficients with Fiscal Decentralisation 1  Coefficients with Fiscal Decentralisation 2 




























































































































100.00 100.00 100.00*† 



























100.00 100.00 100.00*† 
Notes: Provincial public sector spending as a % of GDP is the dependent variable, includes a constant and time fixed effects. Fraction significant includes all cases of 
significant estimates regardless of their sign. CDF non-normal is the proportion of the CDF of the estimated coefficient not assuming normality. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Robust variables using the Sala-i-Martin (1997) 95% criteria have their CDF > 0.95 and are indicated by *. Robust variables using the Leamer (1985) 
criteria are those which the lower and upper extreme bounds have the same sign calculated using the 95 percent confidence intervals for the Max and Min estimates and are 
indicated by †. 
